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admitting testimony under Utah R. Evid. 404(b)? 
3 . Did defendant adequately preserve h i s chal lenge to 
Jury Ins truc t ion No. 13? 
4 . Did Jury Ins truct ion No. 13 create an 
unconst i tut ional mandatory rebuttable presumption? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OP UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
PATRICK D. JOHNSON, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case No. 20814 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Patrick D. Johnson, was charged with 
forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501 (1978), and with burglary, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of forgery and burglary as 
charged, in a jury trial held May 29-30, 1985, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge, presiding. 
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Billings on July 1, 19 85 to a 
term in the Utah State Prison of one to fifteen years for the 
offense of forgery and zero to five years for the offense of 
burglary. 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
On the morning of 2 February 1985, Pastor Harry Deckert 
of the Four Square Church in Salt Lake City, discovered that his 
church had been broken into the night before. Shattered glass 
and blood marked where a burglar had entered the building 
(R. 291 , 2 9 2 ) . Upon f inding that recording equipment had been 
taken f Pastor Deckert n o t i f i e d the p o l i c e (R. 290-292) . After 
the p o l i c e arrived, Pastor Deckert discovered that two books of 
checks in the name of the Four Square Church were missing from 
the desk in h i s o f f i c e (R. 294
 f 2 9 5 ) . 
Later that same day, Lynn Cevering, an employee at 
Macey's Supermarket, cashed one of the checks s t o l e n from the 
Four Square Church (R. 295, 305, 306) . The check was made out to 
Gary or Cary Montoya in the amount of $253 .53 , and the man 
claiming to be Montoya presented a bank card and on o u t - o f - s t a t e 
d r i v e r f s l i c e n s e , nei ther of which included photo i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
(R. 306, 307; S t a t e 1 s Exhibit No. 1 ) . Subsequently, upon picking 
defendant's p ic ture out of a po l i ce photo array, Mr. Cevering 
s ta ted that he was "seventy percent certa in" that i t was defend-
ant who had cashed the check and presented himself as Mr. Montoya 
(R. 311) . At a p o l i c e l i n e - u p , however, Mr. Cevering was unable 
to i d e n t i f y defendant as the man who had cashed the check from 
the Four Square Church (R. 313) . In confronting defendant a t 
t r i a l , Mr. Cevering appears to have remained only seventy percent 
sure that h i s previous i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of defendant was accurate 
(S££ R. 3 98) . 
Also on the same day that Pastor Deckert discovered the 
burglary a t h i s church, 2 February 19 85, Nora Welch, an employee 
a t St imson f s Supermarket, cashed an Eighty Dollar ($80.00) check 
for a man who i d e n t i f i e d himself as Cary Montoya (R. 322-324) . 
The check was a personal check in Mr. Montoya1 s name, and the man 
used a bank card as i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (R. 322-325) . Having seen 
- 2 -
defendant in the s tore on previous occas ions , Ms. Welch was 
"pos i t ive" that i t was defendant who had cashed the check and 
claimed t o be Montoya (R. 326, 327
 f 336 ) . Ms. Welch picked 
defendant's p icture out of a p o l i c e photo away (R. 329) , and at 
an eight-man l ineup she i d e n t i f i e d defendant as the man who had 
cashed the Montoya check (R. 331) . 
Mr. Cary Montoya t e s t i f i e d that he had l o s t h i s 
checkbook a few months prior to the time that the checks were 
cashed at Macey's and Stimson's (R. 341 ) . Mr. Montoya had 
reported t o the p o l i c e that h i s checkbook missing and had c losed 
h i s account (R. 342 ) . Mr. Montoya recognized the check cashed at 
Stimson's as one of h i s missing checks, and defense counsel 
s t i p u l a t e d that the s ignature on the check cashed at Stimson's 
was not that of Mr. Montoya (R. 342) . 
Handwriting expert Steve Rowley t e s t i f i e d that he was 
90-95 percent cer ta in that the checks cashed at Macy's and 
Stimson's in the name of Montoya had been signed by the same 
person (R. 37 4 ) . 
Parole Officer John Shepard t e s t i f i e d that he went to 
defendant's residence on 14 February 1985. Defendant's mother 
allowed Shepard t o enter the apartment, and af ter f inding 
defendant hiding behind the shower curtain with h i s s t r e e t 
c l o t h e s on, Office Shepard conducted a parole search of the 
apartment (R. 346-348) . In a coat c l o s e t , Officer Shepard found 
a check from the Four Square Church as we l l as documents and 
cred i t cards belonging to Cary Montoya (R. 347-350) . 
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The jury considered the evidence and found defendant 
g u i l t y of forgery and burglary as charged (R. 271) . 
[Further f a c t s of t h i s case are discussed below as they 
r e l a t e t o the s p e c i f i c i s s u e s ra ised by defendant.] 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
Because d e f e n d a n t s mother consented to the search of 
her apartmentf because defendant f a i l e d t o make a proper 
object ion a t t r i a l , and because Off icer John Shepard was properly 
act ing wi th in the scope of h i s dut i e s as a parole o f f i c e r when he 
searched defendant's apartment, t h i s Court should re jec t 
defendant's argument that evidence se ized during the search of 
h i s apartment was inadmiss ible at t r i a l . 
Because i t was highly probative of the wrongdoer's 
i d e n t i t y , Nora Weich fs testimony that defendant cashed a forged 
check in the name of Cary Montoya at St imson f s Supermarket was 
properly admitted under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) . 
Defendant f a i l e d to preserve h i s chal lenge to Jury 
Ins truct ion No. 1 3 , because he objected t o i t on d i f f eren t 
grounds than he now r a i s e s on appeal. Moreover, Ins truct ion 
No. 13 did not contain an unconst i tut ional mandatory rebuttable 
presumption. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED BY DEFENDANT'S PAROLE 
OFFICER. 
When Parole Off icer John Shepard searched defendant's 
apartment, he found a check from the Four Square Church and other 
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evidence suggest ing that defendant was g u i l t y of forgery and 
burglary (R. 188 f 189) . After a review of the f a c t s re la ted to 
the search of defendant's homef i t w i l l be shown (1) that there 
are v a l i d reasons why t h i s Court should summarily dismiss 
defendant's argument that the evidence se ized by Officer Shepard 
was inadmiss ible a t t r i a l f without reaching the merits of 
defendant's claim, and (2) that defendant's argument should be 
re jec ted on i t s mer i t s . 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE 
SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE. 
Defendant was re leased on parole from the Utah State 
Prison on 11 December 1984 (R. 181) . He was required to meet 
with h i s parole o f f i c e r s on the day of h i s r e l e a s e , but he did 
not "show up at the parole o f f i c e . . . t i l l [ s i c ] the next day" 
(R. 1 9 5 ) . Later, defendant's parole o f f i c e r s discovered that , on 
9 January 19 85, defendant had pawned a s t e r e o ; t h i s concerned the 
parole o f f i c e r s , because defendant had a h i s tory of drug abuse, 
and the o f f i c e r s feared that defendant might again have a drug 
habit (R. 192 ) . On 13 February 1985, Kyle Jones of the S a l t Lake 
City Pol ice Department met with defendant's parole o f f i c e r s . 
Officer Jones had a warrant for defendant's arre s t , based upon 
evidence that defendant had forged checks of Cary Montoya and the 
Four Square Church, and hoped that the parole o f f i c e r s would be 
able t o help him l o c a t e defendant (R. 204-206) . Because 
defendant had not promptly reported on the day of h i s r e l e a s e , 
because he had pawned a s tereo and might again be abusing drugs, 
and because the po l i ce now had a warrant for h i s a r r e s t , 
defendant's parole o f f i c e r s decided that they should search h i s 
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residence to determine whether he was v i o l a t i n g the condi t ions of 
h i s parole (R. 192, 198) . 
On 14 January 1985, Kyle Jones and three other po l i ce 
o f f i c e r s went to defendant's residence t o arres t him, and Officer 
Shepard went with them in order to conduct a parole search 
(R. 183, 197, 198) . Defendant was l i v i n g with h i s mother, Connie 
Morashita, and the o f f i c e r s met her in the hallway outs ide her 
apartment (R. 184) . Kyle Jones showed Mrs. Morashita the arres t 
warrant. She gave them permission t o go in and see defendant, 
and opened the door for them (R. 184) . Mrs. Morashita t e s t i f i e d , 
"[Plolicemen come to ray house a l o t . And I d idn ' t have nothing 
t o hide from them. I said go in and ta lk to Patrick" (R. 217) . 
Inside the apartment, the o f f i c e r s found defendant 
f u l l y dressed, hiding behind a shower curtain in the bathtub, and 
arrested him (R. 184 , 185 ) . 
Parole Off icer Shepard t e s t i f i e d that he went back i n t o 
the hallway and " [ a l s a courtesy I t o l d her [Mrs. Morashita] that 
. . . I was going to do a parole search, I would l i k e her 
permission to do a search. She gave me permission. She t o l d me 
that she was a Christ ian woman. I t o l d that I was looking for 
s to l en checks. And she said she hoped there wasn f t any." (R. 
186, 1 7 8 ) . Mrs. Morashita s ta ted that she had given the o f f i c e r s 
permission t o enter the apartment, but that she remained in the 
hallway ta lk ing with two of the o f f i c e r s , and that no one ever 
asked her for permission to do a search (R. 217, 218) . 
Officer Shepard then searched the apartment. Buried 
beneath some c l o t h e s in a coat c l o s e t , he found a check from the 
- 6 -
Four Square Church, identification belonging to Cary Montoyaf 
white powder and syringes, and a receipt for a pawned stereo 
(R. 188, 189f 347-350). Officer Shepard turned this evidence 
over to Kyle Jones to be placed in the police evidence room 
(R. 189) . 
B. SUMMARY GROUNDS FOR DISMISSING 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT EVIDENCE 
SEIZED IN THE PAROLE SEARCH WAS 
INADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL. 
There are a t l e a s t two r e a s o n s why t h i s Court should 
summarily r e j e c t d e f e n d a n t ' s argument t h a t the t r i a l court 
improperly admit ted t h e ev idence s e i z e d during t h e p a r o l e search 
of h i s apartment . F i r s t , d e f e n d a n t ' s mother consented t o the 
s e a r c h . Second f defendant f a i l e d t o make a proper o b j e c t i o n a t 
t r i a l . 
1 . DEFENDANT'S MOTHER CONSENTED TO 
THE SEARCH OF HER APARTMENT. 
The r u l e i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a w a r r a n t l e s s s earch 
may be conducted where the o f f i c e r s have been g i v e n v a l i d 
c o n s e n t . .£££, e . g . . Katz. v . Uni ted S t a t e s , 389 U.S. 347 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; 
S t a t e v . H a r r i s . 671 P.2d 1 7 5 , 179 (Utah 1983) . * Fur ther , an 
overwhelming m a j o r i t y of c a s e s take t h e v iew t h a t i f a son or 
daughter , whether or not s t i l l a minor, i s r e s i d i n g i n the home 
1
 Judge B i l l i n g s recognized that Mrs. Morashita may have 
consented t o the search of her apartment (R. 240, 241) . However, 
apparently because she chose to re jec t defendant's claim upon i t s 
mer i t s , Judge B i l l i n g s made no f inding as to whether consent 
e x i s t e d . Nevertheless , the State may properly address the 
consent i s s u e on appeal, because "this Court may affirm the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s dec i s ion to admit evidence on any proper grounds, even 
though the t r i a l court assigned another reason for i t s ru l ing ." 
State v . Gal legos , 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 3 , 24 (Nov. 29, 1985) . 
A£C£Ii3 State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257 (1985). 
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of a parent, the parent's consent to a government search of 
that home will be effective against the son or daughter. ELzs 
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.4(b) (197 8) and cases cited 
therein. In the present case, Officer Shepard testified that 
he asked defendant's mother, Connie Morashita, for permission 
to conduct a search of her apartment and that she explicitly 
consented to his conducting the search (R. 186, 187). And, while 
Mrs. Morashita stated that no one ever asked her permission to do 
a search (R. 217, 218), the facts of this case suggest that 
Officer Shepard1s was probably the more correct account of what 
transpired and that, at the very least, Officer Shepard could 
reasonably have concluded that Mrs. Morishita gave her consent. 
Compare United States v. Kohn. 365 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (E.D.N.Y. 
1973) (surrounding facts are relevant in resolving ambiguity as 
to whether consent has been given). 
Officer Shepard told Mrs. Morashita that he was 
planning to look for stolen checks in her apartment (£££ Brief 
for Appellant at 15; R. 187-189). Mrs. Morashita was cooper-
ative. She testified, "I didnft have nothing to hide from them. 
I said go in and talk to Patrick" (R. 217). Officer Shepard 
stated that Mrs. Morashita unlocked the door for them with her 
key and let them into the apartment (R. 184), and there is no 
indication she in any way objected to their search. The circum-
stances surrounding this search, taken as a whole, corroborate 
Officer Shepard1s testimony that Mrs. Morashita gave him consent 
to search her apartment. £££ Stephensen v. State, 494 S.W.2d 
900, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (important circumstance in 
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determining whether the defendants mother had willingly 
consented to a police search was that "she had no objection to 
the search because she did not want the officers to think that 
she had anything to hide") .2 
2. DEFENDANTS FAILURE TO MAKE A PROPER 
OBJECTION AT TRIAL PRECLUDES HIS 
RAISING THIS ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress the 
evidence seized during the parole search of his apartment. After 
this motion was deniedf defendant made no effort to renew his 
objection at trial. This Court1s ruling in State v» Lesley. 672 
P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) dispositively establishes that defendant may 
not now raise this issue on appeal. In Lesley, this Court held: 
The appellant's position appears to be 
that his filing of a pretrial motion to 
suppress, and its denialf relieved him from 
the necessity of objecting to the evidence at 
trial. This raises a question of first 
impression in this jurisdiction, and we hold 
that, under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, a specific objection is required 
even where a pretrial motion to suppress has 
been madet 
Xd* at 82 (emphasis added). Recognizing his failure to make a 
proper objection at trial, defendant contends that this Court's 
ruling in Lesley should not apply to the present case, claiming 
that Lesley "is specifically limited to those situations where a 
z
 Significantly, contrary to the testimony of the officers 
(R. 207), Mrs. Morashita stated that the officers never showed 
her an arrest warrant or any other kind of document (R. 216). 
In light of Mrs. Morashita1s knowledge that the officers were 
looking for stolen checks, the fact that she may have given the 
officers permission to enter her apartment even without their 
showingng her a warrant, gives this Court still greater reason to 
conclude that Mrs. Morashita consented to the search. 
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defendant does not provide the appellate court with a record of 
the pretrial hearing so that i t can review the pretrial decision." 
(Brief for Appellant at 11 n. 3 ) . This interpretation of Lesley 
i s not accurate. The Lesley defendant's fai lure to provide a 
record of the pretrial hearing was only one of several factors 
motivating th is Court to adopt the rule that a spec i f ic objection 
i s required at t r i a l f even where a pretrial motion to dismiss has 
been made. This Court noted that at t r ia l the judge "is l ike ly to 
have a more complete view of the grounds for excluding or 
admitting certain evidence [than at the pretrial s tages ] ." Xd. 
at 82. The Court added that the fa i lure to renew an objection at 
t r ia l "deprives the t r i a l court of an opportunity to avoid error 
in the t r ia l which may have been created by an improper ruling on 
a pretrial motion based upon inadequate information." Xd* 
For the foregoing reasons, Lesley i s applicable to the present 
case, even though defendant has preserved a record of the pretrial 
hearing and even though, as defendant has noted, Judge Bi l l ings 
heard both the pretrial motion to suppress and presided at t r i a l . 
Accordingly, defendant's fai lure to make a proper objection at 
t r i a l precludes his raising this evidentiary issue on appeal. 
C. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED BY HIS PAROLE 
OFFICER WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED 
AT TRIAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON 
ITS MERITS. 
Defendant's claim that the tr ia l court's admitting the 
evidence seized in the parole search violated his constitutional 
rights rests on two interrelated arguments. First , defendant 
contends that the parole search was not conducted pursuant to 
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Mr* Shepard's dut ies as a parole o f f i c e r . Second, defendant 
a s s e r t s that the parole search was merely a subterfuge for a 
criminal i n v e s t i g a t i o n — i . e . , that the po l i ce i n s t i g a t e d the 
search in order to circumvent the requirement that they s e i z e 
evidence pursuant t o a warrant based upon probable cause. 
1 . PAROLE OFFICER JOHN SHEPARD WAS 
ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS 
DUTY WHEN HE SEARCHED DEFENDANTS 
RESIDENCE. 
The parole o f f i c e r f s function i s t o help convicted 
cr iminals make a "supervised t r a n s i t i o n from prison l i f e — w i t h i t s 
int imate and constant a s s o c i a t i o n with a soc i e ty of lawbreakers 
and a high degree of regimentation—to a complete re integrat ion 
i n t o s o c i e t y without that kind of a s soc ia t ion and regimentation." 
S ta te v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 f 1259 (Utah 1983) . The parole 
o f f i c e r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a l so include "preventing p o s s i b l e 
further a n t i s o c i a l or criminal conduct by the parolee ." Latta v. 
F i t z h a r r i s . 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1975) . £££ alSG State v. 
Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1259 (the o f f i c e r must evaluate the 
paro l ee 1 s progress and a s s i s t the parolee in avoiding further 
criminal conduct.) 
In order to carry out these d u t i e s , the parole o f f i cer 
must " fhave a thorough understanding of the parolee and h i s 
environment, including h i s personal habi t s , h i s re la t ionsh ips with 
other persons, and what he i s doing both a t home and outs ide i t . 1 " 
State Vt Velasquezf 672 P.2d at 1259 ( c i t i n g Latta v. F i t z h a r r i s . 
521 F.2d at 249) . Accordingly, the parole o f f i c e r must have 
"access t o some information that a parolee may be unwil l ing t o 
d ivu lge . . . . " Xfil. The parole o f f i c e r "needs to be be able to 
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act in a manner that could not be tolerated if done by a policeman 
or other agent of the state with respect to an ordinary citizen." 
Id. 
While parole officers are allowed supervisory authority 
over parolees that could not be exercised over ordinary citizensf 
parolees are not without rights against warrantless searches and 
seizures. This Court has adopted the rule that, in order for the 
parole officer to conduct a warrantless search of a parolee1s 
residence, (1) the parole officer must have reasonable suspicion 
that the parolee has committed a crime or parole violation, and 
(2) the search must be "reasonably related to the parole officer's 
duty." Id. at 126 0. 
In the instant case, defendant concedes that Parole 
Officer Shepard had sufficient reasonable suspicion for conducting 
a search of his residence (Brief of Appellant at 15) .3 And the 
district court concluded that there was "no question in this case 
that the parole officer had ample evidence to suspect that the 
defendant had both violated the terms of his parole and had 
committed a crime." (R. 67.) Defendant claims, however, that the 
parole search was not conducted pursuant to Officer Shepard's 
duties as a parole officer. The district court properly found 
that this claim had no merit, stating: 
The second s t e p , however, that the s t a t e 
must persuade t h i s court i s that the search 
was reasonably re lated t o the parole 
o f f i c e r ' s duty. And I b e l i e v e t h i s i s the 
3
 In the court below, counsel for defendant admitted, "There was 
more than reasonable susp i c ion ; there was probable cause." 
(R. 234.) 
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point that is pressed by counsel for the 
defendant. She would argue that because it 
was obvious that the defendant would already 
be taken into custody that there was no 
further need for the parole officer to be 
involved to see whether or not the defendant 
had committed a crime or violated his parole. 
[sic] Court is not persuaded by that 
argument as the court feels that there are 
two independent and unrelated processes which 
begin. One is not controlled by the other. 
When a person is on parole that parole offi-
cer may investigate independently of offi-
cers, and despite what investigation they may 
be doing on new offenses, whether, in fact, 
he has broken the parole agreement. (R. 239). 
There are at least three reasons why the district 
court's conclusion, that the search of defendant's residence was 
reasonably within the scope of Officer Shepard1s duties, was 
proper. 
First, as noted above, it is the parole officer's duty 
to protect the public against antisocial or criminal conduct by 
the parolee. 3£& Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 249. Knowing 
that defendant had pawned a stereo, that he had a history of drug 
abuse, and that the police now had a warrant for his arrest based 
upon probable cause, it was not only reasonable for Officer 
Shepard to conduct a parole search, but his failure to investigate 
the matter would have been a breach of his duty to protect society 
against the lawless acts of the parolee in his charge. 
Second, Officer Shepard owed a duty to defendant 
himself to assist in his rehabilitation. ££. State v. Velasquez, 
672 P.2d at 1259. A prompt parole search, under circumstances 
similar to the present case, benefits the arrested parolee in two 
ways. First, if the parolee has been falsely charged, a finding 
that the parolee's residence is "clean" will tend to exonerate 
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him—a parole search may in fac t reveal exculpatory evidence to be 
used i n the paro lee ' s behalf . Purther f i f f as in t h i s case f there 
i s evidence that the parolee has returned t o a l i f e of drug abuse 
and crime, i t i s in the p a r o l e e ' s own best i n t e r e s t that he be 
returned t o custody and/or r e h a b i l i t a t i v e treatment. Officer 
Shepard would have done a d i s s e r v i c e to defendant, as wel l as to 
the pub l i c , had he not done a l l he reasonably could t o inform 
himself regarding the p o l i c e o f f i c e r s ' evidence that defendant had 
v i o l a t e d h i s parole . 
Third, by conducting the search. Officer Shepard met a 
duty t o h i s profess ion . As the State of Cal i fornia noted in Laijta 
v . F i t z h a r r i s , " ' [ p l a r o l e i s a risky bus iness . Recidivis im i s 
high. If parole f a i l s too o f t en , i t may l o s e i t s v i a b i l i t y as a 
correc t ive i n s t i t i u t i o n . ' " 521 F.2d at 249. When, as here, the 
parole o f f i c e r has strong reason to b e l i e v e that a search w i l l 
uncover evidence of a p a r o l e e ' s criminal a c t i v i t y , the o f f i c e r 
maintains the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the parole system by act ing without 
delay. 
From the foregoing, i t i s c lear that Off icer Shepard 
had reasonable suspic ion to b e l i e v e that defendant had committed a 
crime and that he acted within the scope of h i s duty when he 
searched defendant's res idence . 
2 . THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CON-
CLUDED THAT OFFICER SHEPARD1S SEARCH 
OF DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE WAS A VALID 
PAROLE SEARCH, RATHER THAN A SUBTER-
FUGE FOR A POLICE INVESTIGATION. 
Defendant claims that Officer Shepard's parole 
authori ty was used as a too l to circumvent the requirement that 
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the p o l i c e obtain a warrant in order to search a paro l ee ' s 
res idence . Defendant c i t e s authority for the proposi t ion that , 
where a parole search i s used as a subterfuge for a po l i ce 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n f the admission of evidence se ized in the search 
v i o l a t e s due process* This authority does not detract from the 
v a l i d i t y of the d i s t r i c t court ' s dec i s ion t o admit evidence se ized 
in the parole search, because the d i s t r i c t court express ly found 
that there was HQ evidence to support defendant's claim of 
subterfuge. Judge B i l l i n g s s t a t e d : 
The court i s persuaded that i f there 
were evidence that t h i s was not the good 
f a i t h e f for t on the part of the parole 
o f f i c er to see i f there had been a parole 
v i o l a t i o n or a commission of a crime f which 
i s a parole v i o l a t i o n , but rather he was 
being used as a too l of the p o l i c e rather 
than them obtaining what they would have to 
obtain a search warrant, the court f e e l s the 
motion would be wel l taken. However, the 
court has found no evidence of that in t h i s 
record and, in f a c t , would refer to the case 
c i t e d by counsel for the defendant [State v. 
Velasquez] wherein the court f e e l s the f a c t s 
in that case were a much worse scenario 
(R. 239, 240) . 
There i s substant ia l record evidence in support of 
Judge B i l l i n g ' s f inding that the parole system was not being used 
as a too l of the p o l i c e . Pol ice Officer Kyle Jones t e s t i f i e d 
tha t , after obtaining a warrant for defendant's a r r e s t , he con-
tac ted defendant's parole o f f i c e r s , because he needed ass i s tance 
in l o c a t i n g defendant (R. 206) . Upon learning that the po l i ce 
were planning to make the arrest at defendant's home, Parole Of f i -
cer Shepard said , "I want to go with you." (R. 210.) Officer 
Shepard denied that the po l i ce ever asked him to conduct a search 
of defendant's apartment (R. 197) . He t e s t i f i e d that he was looking 
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for evidence "for us," the parole department, and not for the 
police (R. 197, 198). 
Defendant does not give any affirmative evidence to 
support his claim that, contrary to the testimony of Officers 
Jones and Shepard, it was the police who instigated the search in 
order to circumvent the warrant requirement. Instead, defendant 
relies on innuendo and speculation that the officers acted in bad 
faith. Defendant notes, for example, that when Officer Shepard 
went to defendant's residence, he announced his intent to look for 
stolen checks; defendant argues that Officer Shepard must there-
fore have been acting on behalf of the police. This conclusion 
does not logically follow. Officer Shepard knew that defendant 
had been accused of forging stolen checks from the Four Square 
Church and, for the reasons cited above, he had a duty to find out 
whether defendant was in possession of those stolen checks.4 
As this Court has stated: 
"The mere fact that [a] police officer 
was the first to suspect that [the parolee] 
was engaged in criminal activity and re-
lated this to the parole officer . . . in no 
way alters the legality of the parole offi-
cer's presence [i.e., search]. It does not 
require the suppression of the seized evi-
dence from use in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution." 
4
 It is significant that, in addition to the stolen checks, 
Officer Shepard found a pawn slip for a stereo, along with white 
powder and syringes (R. 189, 349-353). The finding of these 
items substantiates Officer Shepard1s testimony that the search 
was motivated by his genuine concerns as a parole officer that 
defendant might have resumed criminal activity and drug abuse, 
rather than motivated by police desires to have a search 
conducted. 
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State v, Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1263 (citing United States ex rel, 
Santos v. New York Board of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1218 2d Cir. 
1971)) (bracketed language in original). Defendant also points 
out that, upon seizing the stolen items. Officer Shepard turned 
them over to the police, implying that this proves an improper 
complicity between the police and parole department. Officer 
Shepard testified, however, that "lilt's standard procedure when 
the parole department is out with another agency that we hand the 
stuff we find over to that agency to place in their evidence room 
. . . " (R. 189)—an explanation which the district court 
apparently accepted as truthful. Moreover, this Court has stated: 
A parole officer1s search of a parolee, 
however, is not unlawful just because it 
is also beneficial to the police, or 
because evidence incriminating the parolee 
is turned over to the police and used in a 
criminal prosecution. 
Id. at 1262. 
In connection with h i s subterfuge argument, defendant 
attempts to d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s Court's rul ing in State v. Velasquez, 
In Velasquez, at the request of the p o l i c e , the defendant's parole 
o f f i c e r searched h i s apartment and se ized evidence that l ed to h i s 
convict ion of second degree murder. Thereafter, t h i s Court 
unanimously upheld the defendant's convict ion aga ins t h i s claim 
that the parole o f f i c e r had improperly acted as a too l of the 
p o l i c e . Comparing the ins tant case to Velasquez, defendant's 
present claim of inappropriate complic i ty between the po l i ce and 
parole department i s even weaker than the unsuccessful argument 
made by the defendant in Velasquez. 
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Defendant po in t s out that in Velasquez, parole 
a u t h o r i t i e s had decided to search defendant's home before the 
p o l i c e contacted the parole department, and tha t t h i s does not 
appear t o have been so in the present case . This d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
not d i s p o s i t i v e , nor i s the factual d i f ference between the two 
cases as great as defendant would have t h i s Court b e l i e v e . In the 
ins tant case , the parole a u t h o r i t i e s were already concerned about 
defendant's reporting t a r d i l y , h i s pawning the s tereo equipment, 
and h i s p o s s i b l e drug abuse (R. 192 , 198) ; and in Velasquez, the 
parole department was concerned that he might be s e l l i n g drugs, 
i d . at 1257. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , although the parole a u t h o r i t i e s in 
Velasquez had decided to conduct the search before the p o l i c e 
asked them to do so , there i s no ind ica t ion that the search was 
intended to be immediate—rather, in both Velasquez and the 
present case , i t appears that po l i ce contact with the parole 
department acted as a c a t a l y s t , prompting parole searches that 
would eventual ly have taken place even without po l i ce input. 
Furthermore, a number of other fac tors suggest that the p o t e n t i a l 
for improper subterfuge was much greater in Velasquez than in the 
present case . 
F i r s t , in Velasquez, in contact ing the defendant's 
parole o f f i c e r , the p o l i c e department t o l d the parole o f f i c e r that 
i t would be " ' b e n e f i c i a l ' to the po l i ce i f the Parole Department 
would conduct a search." Id* at 1257. In the present case , there 
i s no ind ica t ion that the po l i ce ever asked the Parole Department 
to conduct a search. Nothing in the record controverts Parole 
Officer Shepard's testimony that the search was "for us" and not 
for the p o l i c e (.£££ R. 198) . 
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Moreover, police behavior in the instant case was more 
circumspect and cautious than in Velasquez, In Velasquez, the 
police had no warrant and no probable cause to believe that the 
defendant had murdered his victim. The defendant was merely a 
suspect, based upon his parolee status, his living near the 
victim, and an informant's tip that he was selling drugs. XdU at 
1256. In the present case, however, the police had obtained a 
judicial warrant for defendant's arrest based upon probable cause. 
Further, here the police had a strong case against defendant 
without searching his apartment; as noted above, one witness had 
given a positive identification, and another had given a "seventy-
percent certain" identification, tying defendant to the forgery of 
two checks, one of which had been stolen from the Pour Square 
Church. Certainly, if at all, there was greater motivation to 
circumvent the warrant requirement in Velasquez than in the 
present case. 
After having upheld the parole search in Velasquez, 
where the police had no probable cause and specifically asked the 
Parole Department to conduct the search; it would indeed be 
anomalous if this Court were to hold the search in the present 
case improper, where the police had a warrant based upon probable 
cause and had never asked the parole department to conduct a 
search at all. Judge Billings' conclusion that the Velasquez case 
represents a "much worse scenario" than the present case (R. 240) 
is correct. 
The unstated premise of defendant's argument is that 
the officers in this case were less than truthful when they 
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t e s t i f i e d that the search was conducted for parole purposes and 
not as part of a police investigation* I t was, howeverf for the 
d i s t r i c t court to determine the credibi l i ty of these witnesses. 
Because Judge Bi l l ings found that there was no evidence of 
subterfugef a conclusion that was within her fact-finding 
discretion and adequately supported by the evidence, th i s Court 
should reject defendant's claim of improper complicity between the 
police and parole department. £L££ State v. Royball. 17 Dtah Adv. 
Rep. 16, 17 (Sept. 3 , 1985) ("[Tlhe t r ia l court's ruling on the 
admissibi l i ty of evidence wil l not be reversed absent a showing 
that the t r ia l court so abused i t s discretion as to create a 
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likelihood that injustice resulted.")^ 
POINT II 
BECAUSE IT WAS HIGHLY PROBATIVE OF THE 
DISPUTED ISSUE OF IDENTITY, NORA WELCH'S 
TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT CASHED A 
FORGED CHECK IN THE NAME OF CARY MONTOYA 
AT STIMSONfS SUPERMARKET WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
Defendant was charged with forging a check at Macey's 
Supermarket in an amount exceeding $100 (R. 4 1 , 7 7 ) . 
^ Defendant c i t e s a footnote from Velasquez, in which t h i s Court 
s t a t e d : 
We do not address the problem of whether a warrant 
must be obtained when a parolee i s l i v i n g with 
others who are not paro lees . Caution would cer -
t a i n l y suggest that a warrant be obtained i f 
the r i g h t s of non-parolees might be a f f ec ted . 
We a l so note that no f o r c i b l e entry was made 
in the ins tant case . 
672 P.2d at 126 0 n. 3 . To the extent that i t was meant to 
suggest that a search might be improper where parole o f f i c e r s 
make a f o r c i b l e entry or otherwise employ "Gestapo" t a c t i c s 
aga inst non-parolees f t h i s statement appears to be sound, cf . 
i d . at 126 3 (parole o f f i c e r s may not use "Gestapo" t a c t i c s 
against p a r o l e e s ) . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , there i s in the present case 
no i n d i c a t i o n that the o f f i c e r s v i o l a t e d the r igh t s of non-
paro lees . As noted above f Mrs. Morashita f r e e l y gave the 
o f f i c e r s permission to enter her home, she knew that the o f f i c e r s 
were going t o look for checks, and she made no object ion and 
appears to have even given her consent to the search. Defendant 
c i t e s no instance of s p e c i f i c harm t o any non-parolee. 
To the ex tent , howeverf that d ic ta contained in the above 
footnote can be read t o mean tha t , i f a parolee l i v e s with non-
paro lees , no parole search can be conducted without a warrant 
based upon probable cause, such d ic ta should be discarded. 
Typica l ly , parolees are forbidden t o l i v e or a s s o c i a t e with other 
paro lees . EL&s. e . g . . jjfl. a t 1256. I t fo l lows tha t , except for 
those ins tances in which parolee l i v e s e n t i r e l y alone, parolees 
w i l l almost always l i v e with non-parolees . A holding that parole 
o f f i c e r s must have a warrant based on probable cause to search 
the res idence of any parolee who l i v e s with non-parolees would 
f l y in the face of d e c i s i o n s al lowing parole searches based upon 
reasonable susp ic ion , and would l eave Velasquez i t s e l f almost 
meaningless . Thus, i t cannot be sa id , merely because defendant 
l i v e d with h i s non-parolee mother (and a brother who may or may 
not have been on parole) that a warrantless parole search was 
improper in the present case . 
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His subsequent convict ion of forgery was based l a r g e l y on the 
testimony of two w i t n e s s e s . F i r s t f Macey's employee, Lynn 
Cevering, t e s t i f i e d that f on 2 February 1985 f he cashed a check 
for $253.53 made out to Gary or Cary Montoya from the Four Square 
Church. Cevering s ta t ed that the man for whom he cashed the check 
i d e n t i f i e d himself as Montoya, presenting a bank card and an out -
o f - s t a t e d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e , nei ther of which included photo 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ( S t a t e ' s Exhibit No. 1; R. 3 06, 3 07) . Mr. Cevering 
was "seventy percent certa in" t h a t defendant was the man for whom 
he had cashed the check (R. 311 , 398) , but a t a p o l i c e l ineup he 
was unable to ident i fy defendant (R. 311-313) . 
Nora Welch, an employee at Stimson's Supermarket, 
t e s t i f i e d that on 2 February 1985—the same day the check from the 
Four Square Church was cashed at Macey fs—she cashed a check for a 
man claiming t o be Cary Montoya (R. 322-24).** As at Macey's, the 
man used a photoless bank card for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (R. 322-325) . 
Ms. Welch had seen defendant in her s tore on previous occas ions 
and was "pos i t ive" that i t was defendant who presented himself as 
Montoya and for whom she cashed the check (R. 326, 336 ) . Ms. 
Welch i d e n t i f i e d defendant a t a p o l i c e l ineup and s e l e c t e d h i s 
p ic ture from a photo array (R. 329, 3 3 1 ) . 
Defendant contends that the t r i a l court erred by 
al lowing Ms. Welch to t e s t i f y . He claims that her testimony "was 
s er ious ly pre jud ic ia l s ince the evidence was not probative of a 
material i s s u e , but was merely cumulative." (Brief for Appellant 
at 20 ) . This argument has no merit . 
^ In t h i s ins tance , the check was from Mr. Montoya1s personal 
checking account (R. 322-324) . 
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Dtah R. Evid. 404(b) (Supp. 1984) provides: 
Evidence of other crimesf wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, howeverf be 
admissible for other purposesr such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
This rule is similar to former Utah R. Evid. 55 (1977)7 which was 
interpreted by this Court in State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539 (Otah 
1983), as follows: 
The substance of the rule is inclusionary: 
evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs 
that is competent and relevant to prove some 
material fact, other than to show merely the 
general disposition of the defendantr is 
admissible. The determination of relevancy 
is within the discretion of the trial judge. 
675 P.2d at 546 (emphasis in original). S££. also State v. 
Forsyth. 641 P.2d 1172, 1175-76 (Utah 1982). 
In the instant case, Judge Billings found that 
Ms. Welch1s testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b), because 
it was "very probative" of the wrongdoer1 s identity (R. 164). 
This finding was adequately supported by the evidence. 
' Rule 55 provided: 
Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person 
committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified 
occasion is inadmissible to prove his disposition 
to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for 
an inference that he committed another crime or 
civil wrong or another specified occasion but, 
subject to Rule 45 and 48, such evidence is 
admissible when relevant to prove some other 
material fact including absence of mistake or 
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, or identity. 
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As noted abovef Lynn Cevering was only seventy percent 
cer ta in that i t was defendant who cashed the check at Macey1s 
Supermarket. In l i g h t of Mr. Cevering fs i n a b i l i t y to ident i fy 
defendant a t the p o l i c e l i n e u p , t h i s would have to be considered 
a tenuous seventy percent . Further f the i d e n t i t y of the wrongdoer 
appears to have been very much in d i s p u t e . 8 Ms. Welch1s testimony 
went t o the heart of the i d e n t i t y i s s u e . She p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i -
f i e d defendant as the man who forged the check at St imson's . 
And there was a t i g h t r e l a t i o n s h i p between the f o r g e r i e s at 
Macey1s and a t St imson's: both a c t s occurred on the same dayf 
in both ins tances the man claimed t o be Cary Montoya and used a 
photoless bank card as i d e n t i f i c a t i o n f and handwriting expert 
Steve Rowley t e s t i f i e d that he was 90-95 percent cer ta in that the 
checks cashed at Macey1s and at Stimson's had been signed by the 
same person (R. 374) . 
Defendant argues that any testimony going to i d e n t i t y , 
beyond Mr. Cevering1s seventy percent cer ta in i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , 
c o n s t i t u t e d inadmiss ible cumulative evidence. This p o s i t i o n i s 
untenable in l i g h t of the S t a t e 1 s heavy burden of proving every 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant's re l i ance upon t h i s Court1 s ru l ing in iLtaite 
v . Holder, 6 94 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984) i s misplaced. As the d i s t r i c t 
court noted, the evidence in Holder was found inadmiss ib le . 
b
 £*_&*., on cross-examining Mr. Cevering, defense counsel s t r e s s e d 
that Cevering was "only" seventy per cent sure and "not p o s i t i v e " 
that h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of defendant was accurate (R. 317) , and 
the d i s t r i c t court e x p l i c i t l y s ta ted that the matter of i d e n t i t i y 
was in dispute (R. 164) . 
- 2 4 -
because i t went to an issue t h a t was no longer in dispute 
(R. 164). See i d . a t 584. Whereas, in the present case, 
Ms. Welch's testimony went d i r ec t l y to the disputed issue of 
i d e n t i t y (R. 164). 
Ms. Welch's testimony was nei ther highly pre jud ic ia l to 
defendant nor of an inflammatory nature . Because the t r i a l court 
did not abuse i t s d i sc re t ion in finding t h a t Nora Welch's 
testimony was highly probative of the disputed i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , 
defendant 's argument i s without meri t . £&£. State v- Cauble, 563 
P.2d 775, 7 80 (Utah 1977) ("evidence of another crime i s 
admissible when i t tends to . . . show a common scheme or plan 
embracing commission of similar crimes so re la ted to each other 
t h a t the proof of one tends to e s tab l i sh the crime for which 
defendant i s on t r i a l " ) . 9 
* Defendant a lso argues t h a t , by admitting Nora Welch's 
testimony, the t r i a l court "effect ively n u l l i f i e d i t s ru l ing 
granting the appe l l an t ' s requested severance of the forgery 
counts ." (Brief for Appellant a t 20). There are a number of 
reasons why t h i s Court need not spec i f i ca l ly address t h i s claim. 
F i r s t , the t r i a l court did not sever the forgery counts for the 
due process reasons and other legal considerat ions now suggested 
by defendant. Rather, the severance was granted pursuant to a 
s t i p u l a t i o n by defense counsel and the S ta te (R. 177) . Thus, 
defendant 's arguments to the effect tha t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
substant ive decision to sever should not l i g h t l y be set a s ide , 
even by the t r i a l court i t s e l f , appear to have l i t t l e or no 
relevance in the present context. Second, defendant concedes 
t ha t the underlying bases for h i s severance argument "are nearly 
iden t i ca l to those advanced when the court excludes other crimes 
evidence." (Brief for Appellant a t 24). Accordingly, i t would 
appear tha t t h i s Court could adequately protect defendant 's 
i n t e r e s t s by addressing h is claims under Rule 404(b), without 
l eng th i ly t r e a t i n g defendant 's theory tha t the admission of Ms. 
Welch's testimony should have been excluded by v i r t ue of the 
c o u r t ' s severance of the forgery counts. And f i n a l l y , defendant 
never ra ised t h i s severance argument a t t r i a l . Thus, he should 
noot be permitted to have h i s argument addressed on appeal. S&& 
Sta te v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5 , 8 (Dtah 1984). 
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POINT TTT 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PRESERVE 
HIS CHALLENGE TO JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW; ALTERNATIVELYf THE 
JURY INSTRUCTION DOES NOT CREATE AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANDATORY REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION. 
Defendant c l a i m s t h e t r i a l c o u r t erred by g i v i n g Jury 
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 13 because i t p u r p o r t e d l y c o n t a i n s an uncon-
s t i t u t i o n a l mandatory r e b u t t a b l e presumpt ion . The i s s u e i s not 
p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s Court on a p p e a l , because a t t r i a l de fendant 
o b j e c t e d t o t h e jury i n s t r u c t i o n on d i f f e r e n t grounds than he now 
r a i s e s on a p p e a l . Moreover/ t h e I n s t r u c t i o n , when read i n i t s 
e n t i r e t y , does not c r e a t e an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandatory r e b u t t a b l e 
presumpt ion . 
In S t a t e v . D a v i s , 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) , t h i s Court 
h e l d t h a t , under Utah R. Ev id . 4 ( 1 9 7 1 ) , an i s s u e cou ld no t 
p r o p e r l y be r a i s e d on a p p e a l , u n l e s s t h e a p p e l l a n t s p e c i f i c a l l y 
s t a t e d t o t h e t r i a l cour t the same grounds f o r o b j e c t i o n t h a t he 
p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l . Xd. a t 8 . S i m i l a r l y , i n c o n s t r u i n g Fed. R. 
Ev id . 1 0 3 , which has r e c e n t l y been adopted i n U t a h , 1 0 c o u r t s have 
r e p e a t e d l y h e l d t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l may no t o b j e c t on one b a s i s a t 
t h e t r i a l l e v e l , then r a i s e d i f f e r e n t grounds on a p p e a l . £Lfi£ 
e . g . , ESCQ Corp. V. Uni ted S t a t e s , 750 F.2d 1466 , 1469 (9th C i r . 
1 9 8 5 ) ; Uni ted S t a t e s v . P a r o d i . 703 F.2d 7 6 8 , 782 -83 ( 4 t h C i r . 
1 9 8 3 ) . 
1 U
 Utah R. Evid. 103 " i s the federal rule , verbatim, and i s in 
conformity with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) ." 
Committee Note to Utah R. Evid. 103 . 
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In the instant case, defense counsel objected at tr ia l 
to Instruction No. 13, stat ing: 
The court has substituted a possession 
of property recently stolen instruction that 
she now intends to give on behalf of the 
s tate . I would take exception to that 
instruction on the grounds that while the 
case of State v. Sessions allows a conviction 
to stand on that type of evidence for bur-
glary i t does not require that an instruction 
stating the s t a t e ' s theory or instructing the 
injury to find as a matter of fact that the 
defendant in th i s case committed a burglary 
was not required by the case. 
(R. 266) . The State has examined the foregoing portion of the 
record at length and has been unable to discern the exact grounds 
upon which defendant meant to base his objection at t r i a l . 1 1 
It seems clear, however, that the argument defendant made at t r i a l 
was different than the constitutional issue he now raises on 
appeal. In the t r ia l record, nothing i s said about a possible 
constitutional violation and there i s no hint of his present 
burden shifting argument. 
In the instant casef i t cannot be said that the tr ia l 
court committed plain error in giving Instruction No. 13. ££. 
State v, Poe. 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968) ( tr ia l court fs 
admission of gruesome color s l ides made during the course of 
v ict im's autopsy and displayed to the jury by means of a s l ide 
projector constituted plain error). If defendant believed that 
Instruction No. 13 was constitutionally defective and wished to 
1 1
 In State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978), cited by 
defense counsel at t r i a l , th is Court held that evidence that the 
defendant was in possession of property stolen recently was 
suff ic ient to convict the defendant of burglary. Xd. at 46. 
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preserve the i s sue for appeal f i t was h i s duty to make the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l argument t o the t r i a l court. Assuming arguendo 
that the i n s t r u c t i o n were improper, the t r i a l court would very 
l i k e l y have corrected i t s e l f , expedi t ing f i n a l i t y and economy in 
the l i t i g a t i o n . Because the t r i a l c o u r t ' s g iv ing Ins truc t ion No. 
13 did not c o n s t i t u t e p la in error, and because defendant did not 
ra i se h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y argument a t t r i a l , t h i s Court should 
dismiss defendant's argument on appeal. See Hankerson v. North 
Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n. 8 (1977) (the s t a t e s are permitted 
"to i n s u l a t e past convict ions by enforcing the normal and v a l i d 
rule that f a i l u r e to object to a jury ins truc t ion i s a waiver of 
any claim of error".) 
In the a l t e r n a t i v e , defendant's chal lenge to 
Ins truc t ion No. 13 lacks merit . Defendant r e l i e s on State v. 
Chambersr 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) and State v. Pacheco, 20 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18 (Oct. 21 , 1985) to support h i s contention that 
Ins truct ion No. 13 u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s h i f t e d the burden of proof 
from the State to him. 
However, Chambers i s c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . The jury 
i n s t r u c t i o n in Chambers was nothing more than a verbatim 
r e c i t a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1978) , 1 2 which was 
found to be unconst i tut ional under Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 
1965 (1985) . By comparison, the jury ins truc t ion given in the 
1 2
 Sect ion 76-6-402(1) provides: 
Possess ion of property recent ly s t o l e n , when no 
s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation of such possess ion i s made, 
sha l l be deemed prima f a c i e evidence that the person 
in possess ion s t o l e the property. 
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instant case was significantly different. Instruction No. 13 
provided: 
A related statute provides that: 
"Possession of property recently stolen when 
no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be prima facie 
evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
was in possession of stolen property, that 
such possession was not too remote in point 
of time from the theft, and the defendant 
made no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession, then you may infer from those 
facts that the defendant committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you find 
it justified by the evidence, to connect the 
possessor of recently stolen property with 
the offense of burglary. 
(R. 104). 
The trial judge included an explanatory paragraph which clarified 
the responsibility of the jury with respect to § 76-6-402(1). 
When taken in total, the jury instruction did not shift the burden 
of proof to the defendant. 
The jury instruction given in the instant case is 
substantively identical to the one given in State v. Pacheco, 20 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1985). And the State contends that this Court 
misapplied the holding of Francis v. FranklinP as analyzed and 
applied in Chambersf in deciding that the jury instruction given 
in Pacheco was unconstitutional. In Pacheco this Court created 
the impression that the challenged jury instruction was identical 
to the instruction stricken in Chambers. However, the records in 
those two cases reflect that the instructions given were indeed 
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substantially different. £e& the State1s brief in support of its 
petition for rehearing in Pacheco at 3-10. This Court in Pacheco 
unexplainedly cited only the first paragraph of the overall 
instruction given in Pacheco1s case (which embodied the Chambers 
instruction). Howeverf the Court failed to acknowledge, 
reconcile, or even analyze the impact of the additional clarifying 
and modifying language contained in the Pacheco instruction which 
is critical to the question of whether the overall instruction 
constituted a permissive inference or a mandatory presumption. 
By not analyzing the additional language in the Pacheco instruc-
tion, the Court has created confusion in the law with respect to 
how prosecutors should properly instruct a jury concerning a 
permissive inference under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1953), as 
amended. Indeedf the concern is great given that the Pacheco type 
instruction is a stock instruction used in the Third Judicial 
District. 
The general question presented in the instant case is 
the same as that presented in Franklin. Chambers and Pacheco: 
Did the jury instruction "have the effect of relieving the State 
of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
essential element of a crime?" Franklin, 105 S.Ct. at 1970 
(citations omitted). In deciding whether the instruction is 
unconstitutional under Franklin, the Court must necessarily 
consider all three paragraphs of the instruction as well as other 
instructions given to the jury. As stated in Franklin; 
The analysis is straightforward. 
"The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the 
constitutional analysis applicable to this 
kind of jury instruction is to determine the 
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nature of the presumption it describes.• 
Xd.f at 514, 99 S.Ct., at 2454. The court 
must determine whether the challenged portion 
of the instruction creates a mandatory pre-
sumption, see jjjL., at 520-524, 99 S.Ct., at 
2457-2459, or merely a permissive inference, 
see Dlster County Court v. Allen. 442 U.S. 
140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-2227, 60 
L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). A mandatory presumption 
instructs the jury that it must infer the 
presumed facts if the State proves certain 
predicate facts. A permissive inference 
suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to 
be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, 
but does not require the jury to draw the 
conclusion. 
A permissive inference does not relieve the 
State of its burden of persuasion because it 
still requires the State to convince the jury 
that the suggested conclusion should be 
inferred based on the predicate facts proven. 
Such inferences do not necessarily implicate 
the concerns of Sandstrom. A permissive 
inference violates the Due Process Clause 
only if the suggested conclusion is not one 
that reason and common sense justify in light 
of the proven facts before the jury. Ulster 
County Court, siip-ra, 442 U.S., at 157-163, 99 
S.Ct., at 2224-2227. 
Analysis must focus initially on the 
s p e c i f i c language challenged, but the inquiry 
does not end there. if a specific portion of 
the jury charge, considered in i s o l a t i o n , 
could reasonably have been understood as 
creating a presumption that relieves the 
State of its burden of persuasion on an 
element of an offense, the potentially 
offending words must be considered in the 
context of the charge as a whole. Other 
instructions might explain the particular 
infirm language to the extent that a rea-
sonable juror could not have considered the 
charge to have created an unconstitutional 
presumption. r.npp v. Naught on. 414 U.S. 141, 
147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1973). This analysis "requires careful 
attention to the words actually spoken to the 
jury . . . . for whether a defendant has been 
accorded his constitutional rights depends 
upon the way in which a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted the instruction! 
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SandstroiBf supra, 442 o.s., at 514, 99 s.ct., 
at 2545, 
105 S.Ct. at 1971-72 (emphasis added). 
When this analysis is applied in assessing the validity 
of Instruction No. 13, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror 
could only have understood that instruction to contain a valid 
permissive inference. Firstf although the first paragraph of the 
instruction, if considered in isolation, could reasonably have 
been understood as creating a presumption that relieves the State 
of its burden of persuasion on the elements of burglary, when 
considered in the context of the instruction as a whole, a 
reasonable juror could not have considered that paragraph to have 
created an unconstitutional presumption. The second paragraph, 
which clearly is stated in the form of a permissive inference, 
serves to explain the statement of law in the first paragraph. 
The words "shall be deemed prima facie evidence" are not readily 
understandable to the average juror. Therefore, a reasonable 
juror surely would have read the second paragraph which, 
significantly, begins with the word "thus," as explaining the 
statement of law in the first paragraph. No reasonable juror 
could have read Instruction No. 13 as requiring a finding that 
defendant was guilty of burglary once he found beyond a reasonable 
doubt the enumerated predicate facts. Given the wording of the 
instruction and viewing it as a whole, a reasonable juror would 
have understood that he may, not must, find defendant guilty of 
burglary once satisfied that the predicate facts had been proved 
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beyond a reasonable doubt . 1 3 
This conclusions i s further supported by examining 
other i n s t r u c t i o n s that were given to the jury. Ins truct ion No. 
12 read: 
Before you can convict the Defendant, 
Patrick Johnson, of the crime of Burglaryf a 
Third Degree Felony, as charged in Count II 
of the Information, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubtf all of 
the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 2nd day of 
February, 1985 in Salt Lake County, Utah, the 
Defendant, Patrick Johnson, entered or 
remained unlawfully in the building of 
another; 
2. That he did so unlawfully; 
3. That he did so with the intent to 
commit a theft. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the State has proved each and 
every one of the above-mentioned elements, it 
is your duty to convict the Defendant. On 
the other hand, if the evidence has failed to 
so establish one or more of said elements, 
then you should find the Defendant not 
guilty. 
(R. 103). Instruction No. 23 read in part: 
. . . The burden of proof on the State 
extends to every element of the offense and 
the identity of the perpetrator is such an 
element. The State must prove beyond a 
1 3
 That the instructions1 first paragraph is a verbatim 
recitation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) (197 8) does not 
automatically render the instruction unconstitutional. And, the 
use of the term "prima facie" does not in itself require a 
finding that there is Franklin/Sandstrom error. £&& Chambers/ 
709 P.2d at 325 (noting cases where this Court held that although 
the use of the prejudicial in light of other instructions given 
to the jury). Instruction No. 13 does nothing more than instruct 
the jury on a "traditional common-law inference deeply rooted in 
our law." Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973). 
£££ ALsa State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45-6 (Utah 1978); £!&££ 
v. JKirkhamf 20 Utah Id 44, 432 P.2d 638 (1967) (cases implictly 
recognizing the validity of this common-law inference in the 
context of approving its use in burglary cases). 
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reasonable doubt that Patrick Johnson was 
the perpetrator of the offense. If after 
examining the testimony, you have a reason-
able doubt as to the accuracy of the iden-
tification, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
(R. 114) . Instruction No. 24 read: 
You are instructed that the election of the 
defendant not to testify does not create 
any presumption against him. A defendant 
has the absolute right not to testify, 
and you must not draw any presumption or 
inference of guilty against the defendant 
because he did not testify. Moreover, a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding need 
not present any evidence but may choose to 
rely upon the failure of the State to prove 
every element of the offense and the jury 
is not permitted to draw any inference 
from his failure to do so. Therefore this 
fact should not be discussed by you, or 
enter into your deliberation in any way. 
(R. 115) . And perhaps of most significance, Instruction No. 28 
provided: 
If in these instructions any rule, direction 
or idea has been stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must 
be inferred by you. For that reason, you 
are not to single out any certain sentence, 
or any individual point or instruction, 
and ignore the others, but you are to 
consider all the instructions as a whole, 
and to regard each in the light of all the 
others. 
The order in which the instructions are 
given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. 
(R. 119). 
Instruction No. 13 contains an acceptable permissive 
inference given that "the suggested conclusion is . . . one that 
reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts 
before the jury." Franklin. 105 S.Ct. at 1971. The Supreme Court 
made this clear in Barnes v. United States. 412 U.S. 837 (1973), 
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which held that an instruction on the common-law inference of 
guilty knowledge from the unexplained possession of recently 
stolen property satisfied the requirements of due process. JLd. at 
841-46. £ae .also State v. Sessions; State v. Kirkham, (.amira, 432 
P.2d at n. 2). 
Significantly, the instructions in the present case do 
not have the problems identified by the Court in the instructions 
it found to be unconstitutional in Chambers, There, the verbatim 
recitation of § 76-6-402(1) appeared alone, without the 
explanatory paragraph included in Instruction No. 13. J£e£ 
Chambers, 709 P.2d at 324. Furthermore, in Chambers a separate 
instruction defined the term prima facie in such a way that it 
"could well have indicated to a juror that the defendants were 
required to disprove guilt"—a defect that could not be cured by 
another instruction that restated the presumption in permissive 
form. Id. at 326. 
In sum, Chambers is clearly distinguishable from the 
instant case. Furthermore, this Court misapplied Franklin, as 
analyzed and applied in Chambers, in holding that the jury 
instruction in Pacheco was unconstitutional. Therefore, the jury 
instruction given in the instant case did not unconstitutionally 
shift the burden to defendant to establish his innocence. 
Because defendant objected on different grounds at 
trial than he now raises on appeal, and his substantive claim is 
without merit, this Court should reject defendant's argument that 
the trial court committed reversible error in giving Jury 
Instruction No. 13. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convict ion should be affirmed. 
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